kopiur_api/

creds.rs

//! Pure credential/volume metadata over the CRD types: which Secrets a
//! repository's mover needs. Shared by the controller (envFrom projection,
//! referent watches) and external tooling (`kubectl kopiur doctor`), so the
//! "what credentials does this backend reference" answer cannot fork.

use crate::backend::{Backend, WorkloadIdentity};
use crate::common::Encryption;

/// The backend credentials Secret name for an object-store backend, if any.
///
/// Exhaustive over [`Backend`] (ADR §5.5): a new backend cannot compile until its
/// credential source is decided here. Object stores read keys (e.g.
/// `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`) from `auth.secretRef`; Rclone reads its config from
/// `configSecretRef`; Filesystem has no backend credentials. This Secret is
/// mounted into the mover Job alongside the encryption-password Secret so kopia
/// can reach the store (the in-process filesystem path never needs it).
pub fn backend_auth_secret_ref(backend: &Backend) -> Option<&crate::common::SecretRef> {
    match backend {
        Backend::S3(b) => b.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.secret_ref.as_ref()),
        Backend::Azure(b) => b.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.secret_ref.as_ref()),
        Backend::Gcs(b) => b.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.secret_ref.as_ref()),
        Backend::B2(b) => b.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.secret_ref.as_ref()),
        Backend::Sftp(b) => b.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.secret_ref.as_ref()),
        Backend::WebDav(b) => b.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.secret_ref.as_ref()),
        Backend::Rclone(b) => b.config_secret_ref.as_ref(),
        Backend::Gdrive(b) => b.credentials_secret_ref.as_ref(),
        Backend::Filesystem(_) => None,
    }
}

/// Which cloud IAM plane a workload-identity backend federates with. Drives the
/// cloud-specific mover wiring (the Azure pod label; docs/messages naming the
/// right SA annotation).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum WorkloadIdentityCloud {
    /// AWS: IRSA (web-identity token) or EKS Pod Identity via the minio-go
    /// credential chain.
    S3,
    /// Azure Workload Identity: the azure-workload-identity webhook injects
    /// `AZURE_TENANT_ID`/`AZURE_CLIENT_ID`/`AZURE_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILE` into
    /// pods carrying the opt-in label and running as the federated SA.
    Azure,
    /// GKE Workload Identity: ambient ADC via the GKE metadata server.
    Gcs,
}

/// The backend's workload-identity binding, if any, with its cloud plane.
///
/// Exhaustive over [`Backend`] (ADR §5.5): only S3/Azure/GCS can carry one —
/// the other backends' auth types make it unrepresentable, and a new backend
/// cannot compile until its arm is decided here.
pub fn backend_workload_identity(
    backend: &Backend,
) -> Option<(&WorkloadIdentity, WorkloadIdentityCloud)> {
    match backend {
        Backend::S3(b) => b
            .auth
            .as_ref()
            .and_then(|a| a.workload_identity.as_ref())
            .map(|wi| (wi, WorkloadIdentityCloud::S3)),
        Backend::Azure(b) => b
            .auth
            .as_ref()
            .and_then(|a| a.workload_identity.as_ref())
            .map(|wi| (wi, WorkloadIdentityCloud::Azure)),
        Backend::Gcs(b) => b
            .auth
            .as_ref()
            .and_then(|a| a.workload_identity.as_ref())
            .map(|wi| (wi, WorkloadIdentityCloud::Gcs)),
        Backend::B2(_)
        | Backend::Sftp(_)
        | Backend::WebDav(_)
        | Backend::Rclone(_)
        | Backend::Gdrive(_)
        | Backend::Filesystem(_) => None,
    }
}

/// A credential Secret a mover Job needs, with the namespace it is sourced from.
/// `namespace` is the resolved *source* namespace (where the operator reads the
/// Secret when projecting), not the Job's namespace. `None` only when neither the
/// reference nor the repository carries one — which projection treats as an
/// actionable error (a `ClusterRepository` reference must pin a namespace).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CredsSecretRef {
    /// Name of the credential `Secret`.
    pub name: String,
    /// Resolved source namespace, if known.
    pub namespace: Option<String>,
}

/// The highest per-repository credential-Secret index [`mover_creds_secret_refs`]
/// can ever yield: the encryption-password Secret (idx 0) plus, only when it is
/// differently named, the backend's auth Secret (idx 1). Every consumer that
/// derives per-index resource names (projected copies, server mirrors) bounds
/// its reap walks with this.
pub const MAX_CREDS_IDX: usize = 1;

/// The distinct credential Secrets a mover Job for `backend` + `encryption` needs
/// as `envFrom`, each with its resolved *source* namespace: always the
/// encryption-password Secret, plus the backend `auth` Secret when present and
/// differently named. Deduped by name, order-stable (password first).
///
/// `repo_namespace` is the referencing repository's own namespace (a namespaced
/// `Repository`), used as the source-namespace fallback when a reference omits
/// one; pass `None` for a cluster-scoped `ClusterRepository`, whose references
/// pin their own namespace. This is the single source of the dedup/order contract
/// that [`mover_creds_secrets`] (names only) is built on.
pub fn mover_creds_secret_refs(
    backend: &Backend,
    enc: &Encryption,
    repo_namespace: Option<&str>,
) -> Vec<CredsSecretRef> {
    let source_ns = |ns: Option<String>| ns.or_else(|| repo_namespace.map(str::to_string));
    let mut refs = vec![CredsSecretRef {
        name: enc.password_secret_ref.name.clone(),
        namespace: source_ns(enc.password_secret_ref.namespace.clone()),
    }];
    if let Some(auth) = backend_auth_secret_ref(backend)
        && !refs.iter().any(|r| r.name == auth.name)
    {
        refs.push(CredsSecretRef {
            name: auth.name.clone(),
            namespace: source_ns(auth.namespace.clone()),
        });
    }
    refs
}

/// The distinct credential Secret names a mover Job for `backend` + `encryption`
/// needs as `envFrom`: always the encryption-password Secret, plus the backend
/// `auth` Secret when present and different. Deduped, order-stable (password
/// first). The common single-secret setup (password + keys in one Secret)
/// collapses to one entry. Names-only projection of [`mover_creds_secret_refs`].
pub fn mover_creds_secrets(backend: &Backend, enc: &Encryption) -> Vec<String> {
    mover_creds_secret_refs(backend, enc, None)
        .into_iter()
        .map(|r| r.name)
        .collect()
}

/// Env-var prefix under which a replication mover receives the **destination**
/// backend's credential Secret (`envFrom.prefix`). The source backend's Secret is
/// delivered unprefixed (kopia reads the plain names at `repository connect` and
/// persists them), so the two sides never collide even when both are the same
/// backend family with different keys (issue #200). The mover reads these back to
/// authenticate the `kopia repository sync-to` destination.
///
/// The credential env-var *names* a backend reads (`AWS_*`, …) live on
/// [`ConnectSpec::direct_credential_env_names`](../../kopiur_kopia/client/enum.ConnectSpec.html)
/// in the kopia crate — that is the type that knows kopia's env binding, and the
/// replication mover builds its remap from the `ConnectSpec` it hands to `sync-to`.
pub const DEST_ENV_PREFIX: &str = "KOPIUR_DEST_";

/// Env var carrying the **destination** repository's encryption password
/// (`KOPIA_PASSWORD`) into a snapshot-replication mover. The source password
/// rides the plain `KOPIA_PASSWORD` (persisted into the source kopia config at
/// connect), so the destination's must arrive under a distinct name — the mover
/// reads this and re-exports it as `KOPIA_PASSWORD` for the destination client
/// only. Deliberately NOT `{DEST_ENV_PREFIX}KOPIA_PASSWORD` mechanical prefixing:
/// the controller delivers it as a single `valueFrom.secretKeyRef` env var built
/// from the RESOLVED destination credentials (which may be a projected copy with
/// a different Secret name), not via an `envFrom` prefix remap.
pub const DEST_KOPIA_PASSWORD_ENV: &str = "KOPIUR_DEST_KOPIA_PASSWORD";

/// Env-var prefix under which a **seeding** bootstrap mover receives the seed
/// SOURCE's credential Secret (`envFrom.prefix`), the mirror image of
/// [`DEST_ENV_PREFIX`].
///
/// The local repository's own credentials arrive unprefixed (kopia reads the
/// plain names at `repository connect` and persists them into its config), so
/// the two sides never collide even when both are the same backend family with
/// different keys. A distinct prefix from `KOPIUR_DEST_` matters because a
/// single repository can carry BOTH a `spec.seed` and be a replication source:
/// reusing one prefix would make the two overlays ambiguous.
pub const SEED_ENV_PREFIX: &str = "KOPIUR_SEED_";

/// Env var carrying the seed SOURCE repository's encryption password into a
/// seeding bootstrap mover, the mirror image of [`DEST_KOPIA_PASSWORD_ENV`].
///
/// **Migrate mode only.** A blob-mode seed (`kopia repository sync-to`) copies
/// storage verbatim and the copy therefore keeps the mirror's format and
/// password — there is exactly one password in play, the local repository's own
/// `KOPIA_PASSWORD`, and this var is unset. Migrate mode reads two genuinely
/// different repositories, so the source's password must arrive under a name
/// that cannot be mistaken for the destination's.
///
/// Deliberately NOT `{SEED_ENV_PREFIX}KOPIA_PASSWORD` by mechanical prefixing:
/// like `KOPIUR_DEST_KOPIA_PASSWORD`, the controller delivers it as a single
/// `valueFrom.secretKeyRef` built from the RESOLVED source credentials (which
/// may be a projected copy under a different Secret name), not via an `envFrom`
/// prefix remap.
pub const SEED_KOPIA_PASSWORD_ENV: &str = "KOPIUR_SEED_KOPIA_PASSWORD";

#[cfg(test)]
mod dest_env_tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn dest_env_prefix_is_stable() {
        assert_eq!(DEST_ENV_PREFIX, "KOPIUR_DEST_");
    }

    /// The controller writes this env var into replication mover Jobs and the
    /// mover reads it back by name — a rename would silently break every
    /// in-flight Job across a skewed upgrade, so the literal is pinned exactly
    /// like [`DEST_ENV_PREFIX`]'s.
    #[test]
    fn dest_kopia_password_env_is_stable() {
        assert_eq!(DEST_KOPIA_PASSWORD_ENV, "KOPIUR_DEST_KOPIA_PASSWORD");
    }

    /// Same wire-contract pin as the destination pair: the controller writes
    /// these into seeding bootstrap Jobs and the mover reads them back by name,
    /// so a rename would silently break every in-flight Job across a skewed
    /// upgrade.
    #[test]
    fn seed_env_names_are_stable() {
        assert_eq!(SEED_ENV_PREFIX, "KOPIUR_SEED_");
        assert_eq!(SEED_KOPIA_PASSWORD_ENV, "KOPIUR_SEED_KOPIA_PASSWORD");
    }

    /// The seed and destination overlays must never collide: one repository can
    /// be both a seed target and a replication source, and a shared prefix
    /// would make the two `envFrom` remaps ambiguous.
    #[test]
    fn seed_and_dest_prefixes_are_disjoint() {
        assert_ne!(SEED_ENV_PREFIX, DEST_ENV_PREFIX);
        assert!(!SEED_ENV_PREFIX.starts_with(DEST_ENV_PREFIX));
        assert!(!DEST_ENV_PREFIX.starts_with(SEED_ENV_PREFIX));
    }
}